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The 3 Rs: Regulation, risk and responsibility in British utilities since1945. 
 
Martin Chick* 
 
School of History, Classics and Archaeology, University of Edinburgh, Scotland.  
 
 
      Before privatisation, required rates of return and test discount rates were being applied to utility 
and other nationalised industries. One effect of this new approach was to promote more marginal-cost 
based tariffs which could fall particularly heavily on low-income groups. This trend was reinforced by 
privatisation which, when accompanied by market liberalisation, increased uncertainty about the likely 
returns on capital investment  projects.  Both of these issues, the treatment of poverty and coping with 
uncertainty, were of long-standing concern to the Austrian school of economics. Where Austrian 
economists differed from liberalising governments was in their locating of responsibility.    
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Introduction 
 
      Both as nationalised and then as privatised industries, utilities such as electricity, 
gas, water and telecommunications were subject to test and regulated rates of return 
on capital investment. While in their early years as nationalised industries, the capital 
performance requirements were vaguely embedded in an instruction to cover costs 
taking one year with another, from the early 1960s initially required rates of return 
and later test rates of discount were specified. Increasingly reflecting, in principle at 
least, the wish to cover long-run marginal costs, this approach towards capital 
investment affected both the level and structure of pricing tariffs. Whereas the early 
average-cost pricing of the nationalised industries had effectively cross-subsidised 
between the differing connection and supply costs of the utility, long-run marginal 
cost pricing structures attributed costs according to where and by whom they were 
incurred. This gave rise, especially after privatisation, to concerns that low-income 
groups were being disadvantaged by pricing structures in which standing charges 
bulked disproportionately large. Particular concerns were expressed about the 
consequences for low-income groups of the privatisation and regulation of the 
electricity and water utilities, and this article will concentrate on these two utilities. 
Not only did each produce output for which there were no complete substitutes, but as 
capital-hungry industries both provide loci for a further issue concerning capital 
investment, namely the provision of adequate capacity for future supply requirements. 
In electricity in particular, the introduction of competition into the industry and the 
privatisation of other fuel and power industries, increased the risks of making sunk 
capital investment in the industry precisely because the returns were less certain than 
they had been. The problem had shifted in part from securing adequate returns on 
utility capital investment to offering sufficient returns to solicit further investment. 
The increased risk arose from the liberalisation of the industry, and as such revived 
memories of the early-Austrian school of economists and their concern that 
theoretically static analyses of what were actually dynamic markets understated the 
importance of risk and, at times, uncertainty in shaping the fixed capital investment 
decisions. As well as analysing the changing approach to the capital investment of  
________ 
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 2 
utilities, and its consequences for the pricing and availability of output, this article 
will also use post-liberalisation anxieties over the future adequacy of capacity as an 
occasion for revisiting some of the concerns of the Austrian- and neo-liberal 
economists concerning both capital investment decisions and approaches towards the 
treatment of low-income groups. In so doing, it will also reflect if, and if so how, 
there has been a shift in the scope and instruments of government responsibility in 
ensuring the provision and accessibility of utility output. 
 
Regulation 
 
      The initial guidelines on undertaking capital investment given to the newly 
nationalised industries were vague and implicit in ‘covering costs taking one year 
with another’ whose main purpose was to inform pricing rather than capital 
investment. It seemed to be taken for granted that the costs to be covered would be 
average rather than marginal, and that this was so was made explicit when the 
economist James Meade urged the merits of marginal cost pricing on the Lord 
President, Herbert Morrison. The social ambition of connecting and supplying 
households cheaply on a cross-subsidised postalisation basis was made clear by 
Morrison in May 1946: 
 
      “The fundamental purpose of nationalisation was ….to secure greater efficiency in the 
industry….to reduce costs and provide surplus funds which could be used to extend the benefits of 
cheap electricity to rural areas where ….electricity was either not available or unreasonably expensive 
….Ultimately, he would like to see a standard charge for electricity throughout the whole country, the 
tariff varying according to the purposes for which the electricity was being used, and the industry being 
at liberty to make special arrangements with individual interests……He realised that this system of 
postalisation had its opponents among some of the economists, but he did not find the arguments which 
they advanced convincing. The argument that each consumer should pay the precise cost incurred in 
bringing electricity to his premises would, if followed to its logical conclusion, prevent even a small 
municipality from adopting a system of standard charges within its own boundaries.”
1
  
 
      In fact, the rolling out of the network to distant locations could have been funded 
separately and without being bundled up in the tariff structure. The concern of 
economists like Meade was not particularly with the one-off cost of extending the 
supply system, but with the relationship between current prices and the (short- and) 
long-run marginal costs in an industry with non-stockable output. From the mid-
1950s, against a background of economically spurious but politically charged concern 
with public expenditure, the Treasury was able to press its case for reformed tariff 
structures echoing Meade’s earlier concern with marginal cost pricing. As explained 
elsewhere
2
 the Treasury’s route to the desired reform of pricing structure, was not 
through pricing itself but instead by requiring higher returns on capital investment. 
The initial break-even requirement gave way to the requirement from 1961 that 
nationalised industries earn required rates of return, and then, moving from an ex post 
to ex ante approach, to requiring proposed capital investment projects to meet a test 
discount rate set by the Treasury.
3
 This in turn impacted on pricing structures, the 
bulk supply tariff for electricity moving closer to reflecting the long-run marginal cost 
of supply.
4
 The tightening of ex ante tests and ex post returns on capital investment 
predated privatisation by more than a decade and continued through privatisation into 
regulation. While US-style capital regulation was not chosen for fear of regulatory 
capture and ‘gold-plating’ over-investment, the RPI-X regulatory mechanism 
developed by the economists Stephen Littlechild and Michael Beesley, initially for 
telecommunications, necessarily contained implicit judgements on the permitted 
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returns on capital investment.
5
 While technically RPI-X made cross-subsidisation for 
entry-deterrent purposes possible and of concern,
 
the trend towards pricing at long-run 
marginal cost continued.
6
 This was associated with an interest in segmenting markets 
so as to reflect specific attributable costs of supply. A similar process had occurred in 
the United States where regulation moved away from fully distributed cost as the 
basis for rate-making. Under the fully distributed cost approach, common costs were 
allocated on the basis of the relative shares of quantities such as output, peak demand, 
and revenue of attributable cost.
 
From the early 1970s, and using concepts drawn from 
the theory of co-operative games, an increasingly influential approach was developed 
by economists, many of them employed by AT&T’s subsidiary Bell Laboratories, for 
allocating responsibility for common costs among services so as to avoid cross-
subsidy. The Federal Communications Commission undertook a series of 
investigations lasting from 1964 until the late 1970s concerning the impacts of 
different fully distributed cost methods applied to various message, private line and 
telegraphic services offered by AT&T. One of the many criticisms made of the fully 
distributed cost approach by economists in giving evidence to the Federal 
Communications Commission was, to quote William Baumol, that ‘fully distributed 
cost test deals with only one circumstance, that is, it deals with the service as it is 
operated or has been operated. It involves no incremental comparison. It does not 
compare the circumstance of the user with the service and in the absence of the 
service’. 7 Pricing at long-run marginal cost did look forwards to what might come 
rather than backwards to what was, and as such did offer greater encouragement for 
the marginal systems analysis of future investment. In addition to segmenting 
markets, one consequence of pricing at long-run marginal cost was to make clearer 
distinctions between the fixed and operating costs of supply. This was a long way 
from Morrison’s approach to cross-subsidisation and it reflected a changed concern to 
maximise and reallocate the consumers’ surplus. These and similar developments in 
regulatory tariff–making in electricity in the United States during the 1970s were 
watched closely by the UK Treasury, in particular transcripts of Alfred Kahn’s 
evidence and analyses at regulatory commissions being sent to Great George Street, 
London.
8
  
      Standing charges not only formed a higher proportion of the total bill for low 
users of output, but, reflecting the emphasis on pricing for capital investment 
provision, their level was likely to rise faster than marginal unit charges. The 
combined effect of increased standing and unit charges for electricity fell particularly 
on older (low usage) and poorer (low income and restricted usage) households.
9
 In 
spite of stable production and demand, electricity prices for residential consumers in 
the UK increased between 1990 and 1995, an increase that was not justified by any 
change in the cost of oil, gas or coal. Yet while prices to residential consumers rose, 
those to industrial users in the UK fell by around 25% between 1985 and 1995.
 10
 
Discounts were offered in the more competitive markets for large customers.
11
  
  While standing charges to domestic electricity consumers rose by 47% and unit 
charges by 40% between 1987 and 1995, compared with a retail price increase of 
38%, the average increase was larger in water. In aggregate, the ten privatised water 
and sewerage firms in the UK increased the average charge for domestic users 
between 1989-1990 and 1993-1994 by 55%, compared to an increase of 39% between 
1985-1986 and 1989-1990. Between particular regions, there was a considerable 
variation in price changes, by as much as 76% between the two extreme cases. The 
average bill in the region served by South West rose by 187% between 1989 and 
1994, whereas the increase was only 30% for that served by Thames and 24% for that 
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served by North West over the same period.
 
As the regulated price of water rose, so 
too did the number of families who were unable to pay for a water service. In 1990-
1991, there were 7,673 disconnections of water service in the UK; in 1991-2 there 
were 21,286; the following year there were 18,636. Whereas in 1989, 1% of families 
were in arrears on their water bills, by 1994  this figure had risen to 9%. This problem 
of unpaid bills came about partly because of the gap created  between the amount 
charged by the water companies and a new system of income support instituted in 
1988. Previously families dependent on state assistance benefited from a mechanism 
that automatically paid water bills. Beginning in 1988, families had to pay their water 
bills using the subsidy provided, which calculated a theoretical charge for water of 
£1.65 per week, compared with the water companies’ effective charge  of £2 per 
week.
12
  
      Problems of poverty also coincided with an increase in income inequality. While 
inequality increased in all OECD countries, it occurred to a much greater extent than 
average in the UK regardless of whether one considers family income, spending or 
wages.
 13
 At the beginning of the 1970s inequality was higher than it had been for at 
least 30 years. While the rise in inequality which began in the 1970s obviously cannot 
be attributed to a ‘Thatcher’ effect, her governments did little to end this reversal of 
the post-war trend towards greater income equality.
14
 While in 1979 the proportion of 
the British population below 50% of median  income was slightly more than 5%, by 
1997 it was around 15%. The percentage of the population under 60% of median 
income doubled over the same period. In 1979, the share of total income held by the 
tenth decile was 4.5 times that held by the first decile; in 1995 it was 8 times. The gap 
between those with the highest and lowest incomes widened because the richest decile 
saw its income grow by 50% in real terms over the period, while the poorest decile 
suffered a drop in real income of 14%.
15
  
      The composition of the poorest also changed. In place of the traditional 
predominance of pensioners in the ranks of the poorest, at the turn of the twenty-first 
century 70% of the low-income families were unemployed people, single parents, 
invalids, the infirm, and the ‘working poor’. A third of children in the UK lived in 
families in conditions of poverty, the largest proportion in the European Union.
16
 
Whether one chooses 40%, 50% or 60% of the contemporary average income as a 
poverty line, there was a major increase in poverty between 1979 and 1992/3. In 
1994, 9.9 million individuals in 5.7 million families were dependent on the minimum 
means-tested benefit Income Support; that is about one person in six in the UK. These 
figures compare with 4.4 million people in 2.9 million families receiving 
Supplementary Benefit (Income Support’s predecessor) in 1979. By this measure, 
poverty more than doubled in the decade and a half after 1979.
17
 
      Without wishing to interfere with pricing structures, the utilities’ means to palliate 
the electricity and water bills of the lowest income groups were limited. To address 
the problem of disconnection, utilities offered prepayment meters. In 1991 there were 
48,000 disconnections for non-payment of the electric bill; this fell to 18,000 in 
1992.
18
 In both electricity and water, the fall in the number of disconnections was 
linked to the introduction of prepayment systems: 2.3 million in 1992 for electricity, 
780,000 for gas. However, as Florio notes, such a widespread use of prepayment 
meters disguised the problem of disconnection. Service to households with 
prepayment meters was not actually interrupted, per se, but if users were not in a 
position to pay, they were forced into periodic disconnection. According to a study in 
Bristol and Birmingham conducted by the Rowntree Foundation, the introduction of 
prepayment meters had a dramatic  effect in reducing fuel consumption in the 
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households interviewed. This was achieved for instance by cutting the number of 
cooked meals and minimising the use of hot water.
 There is evidence of ‘fuel poverty’ 
in the UK after privatisation. Conventionally, the threshold amount of income that can 
affordably be devoted to energy expenditures is 10%. According to this definition, in 
1996 in England alone 5 million households (8.5% of families in the UK) were in a 
state of fuel poverty.
19 
The government was driven to increase cash transfers to 
particular social groups (e.g. winter fuel payments). Apparently government had not 
lost the wish to tackle fuel and water poverty, but through privatisation it had 
effectively given up the means of doing so by acting directly on prices. 
 
Risk 
  
      Many of the economic benefits of the privatisation programme were expected to 
follow on from the introduction of competition in the former public monopolies. To 
economists, the potential benefits of liberalisation considerably exceeded benefits 
arising from a transfer of the industry from public to private ownership. The 
liberalisation of an industry’s contestable markets could precede, coincide with or 
follow the industry’s privatisation. In 1982, in the Oil and Gas (Enterprise) Act and in 
1983 in the Energy Act, liberalisation was attempted before privatisation. Following 
the privatisation of British Gas as a monopoly, the task of promoting entry into the 
industry was left to the regulator. Learning from experience, in the run-up to the 
privatising Electricity Act of 1989, the government actively sought to restructure the 
industry and then sell it in its competitive form. Investors fought shy of the nuclear 
power component of the generating section of the industry with its unknown but 
probably high decommissioning costs for which inadequate provision had hitherto 
been made by governments. Privatisation transferred risks about which potential 
private investors wanted more information. Part of the appeal of competition for its 
advocates was that information was dispersed throughout the market, that if prices 
reflected (social) marginal costs then these reflections of resource costs were also 
transmitted to and fro between consumers and producers, and that the heightened risks 
of competition provided incentives for efficiency. While by the 1980s economics 
textbooks could set out clearly the virtues of marginal-cost pricing arising out of 
perfectly competitive markets, the likelihood of competitive markets leading to 
efficient resource allocation had been fiercely contested for much of the twentieth 
century. Meade’s early contributions on the use of marginal cost pricing in socialised 
industries arose in response to his reading and reviewing of Abba Lerner’s Economics 
of Control. Around the same time as Lerner’s book, Oskar Lange offered his analysis 
of a possible use of centrally planned announcements of prices for resources and the 
incorporation of these prices by socialist managers in their production plans. As 
resource shortages or surpluses became apparent, so announced prices would be 
adjusted.
20
 
     Some of the fiercest criticisms of socialist planning predated the work of Lange 
and Lerner and centred on the issue of information. Interwar criticism from the 
Austrian school of economists was probably best encapsulated in Ludwig von Mises’s 
1922 book Socialism: An Economic and Sociological Analysis, von Mises’s thinking 
drawing in turn on that of Carl Menger and his Grundsätze der Volkswirtschaftslehre 
(Principles of Economics) as well as on that of Böhm-Bawerk.
21
 In his turn, von 
Mises was to influence Friedrich von Hayek, whose work enjoyed belated popularity 
with sections of the Conservative party and governments from the mid-1970s. It was 
in part in response to the interwar debate on the possibility of the socialist economic 
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calculation that von Mises and then von Hayek came to develop an ‘Austrian’ 
approach to pricing which differed from that emerging from a combination of the 
work of Marshall and Walras. One of the central questions asked by the Austrian 
economists was how prices and markets were formed; that while equilibrium 
economics might be able to explain how an existing market worked, it could not 
provide a convincing explanation of how the market came to exist in the first place. 
As such, it was unlikely to be able to explain how future markets might develop over 
time, the concept of time being central to the distinction between static and dynamic 
economic analysis. Much of this thinking was drawn together by von Mises in his 
publication in 1940 of Nationalökonomie, later translated and published as Human 
Action. Hayek’s papers written in response to the socialist calculation debate were 
gathered together and republished in his 1948 Individualism and Economic Order.
22
 
While there were significant differences in the ways in which Mises and Hayek 
respectively identified the essence of their understanding of the theory of price, as 
distinct from that of mainstream theory, nevertheless their shared scepticism as to 
what a static view of markets had to offer formed a strong common bond. In an 
observation predating by over half-a-century later criticisms of the efficient market 
hypothesis, Hayek observed that: ‘it is generally made to appear as if these questions 
of how the equilibrium comes about were solved. But, if we look closer, it soon 
becomes evident that these apparent demonstrations amount to no more than the 
apparent proof of what is already assumed. The device generally adopted for this 
purpose is the assumption of a perfect market where every event becomes known 
instantaneously to every member’. 23 For the Austrians a key role for an entrepreneur 
was to create new information; a manager might exploit existing information that was 
imperfectly known. 
      One aspect of Austrian economics developed by Mises and Hayek, and then later 
by Israel Kirzner, concerned uncertainty about the future, particularly as it affected 
capital investment decisions. In emphasising concern with uncertainty, the Austrians 
shared some of Keynes’s concerns and the Austrian concern with time and the 
continual process of forming markets was of interest to John Hicks.
24
 In addition to 
developing the IS-LM model of Keynes’s General Theory, Hicks wrote three books 
on capital theory, referring back to the Austrian economists in particular in the last of 
the three books, that on Capital and Time.
25
 In the context of the liberalisation of 
former nationalised monopolies, the uncertainty affecting capital investment decisions 
was particularly pertinent given the actual and greater potential exposure of industries 
like electricity to competition, both inside and from outside the industry. Both in the 
Victorian and Edwardian system of concessions, then as municipal enterprises and 
subsequently as nationalised monopolies assurances on probable returns were given 
and were frequently accompanied and secured by a period free from competition. The 
1870 Tramways Act inaugurated the system of providing limited period franchises  
which was initially usually for 21 years but was subsequently extended to 42 years in 
1888.
26
 Nationalisation represented an extension of this process in which (often 
national) monopolistic conditions were established as the norm, public ownership 
being preferred to regulation as a means of extracting for consumers the benefits of 
improvements in productivity. Thus, where privatisation was eventually successful in 
not only transferring ownership but also in introducing competition into sections of 
each industry, then it reintroduced risk and uncertainty into markets from which it had 
been absent from decades. In theory, privatisation also increased each industry’s 
responsibility for the consequences of its own decisions, reduced the role and 
responsibility of the state, and increased the exposure of industries to economic 
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change. Now, if poor decisions were made, as with the early civil nuclear power 
programme of the 1950s, then ultimately the state should no longer absorb the loss. If 
relative competitive prices threatened to alter markets significantly from what had 
been expected, as had happened with the commercial exploitation of North Sea gas, 
then the State ought no longer to use a mix of taxation and price interference to 
mitigate the pace and size of the shift in relative prices. If a nationalised industry like 
coal mining struggled to find markets in the face of falling oil prices, then the state 
should not again force other nationalised industries like electricity to increase their 
coal-burn while at the same time increasing taxes and duties so as to restrict oil and 
coal imports.
27
  
      Much of the early discussion of the liberalisation of former nationalised monopoly 
markets focussed on how to encourage new entrants into the industry. As such, a keen 
concern was to prevent the incumbents from exploiting the combination of existing 
sunk investments and proportionately low marginal costs to deter entry. What was 
discussed less was how the increase in risk and uncertainty arising from increased 
competition in markets would impact on the ability to attract new sunk investment. 
Indeed, rather than under-investment, it was concern with Averch-Johnson style over-
investment which was of most concern to those devising new regulatory incentive 
structures.
28
 The mainly RPI-X regulatory periods were kept short to around 5 years, 
not least because their extension to 10 or 15 years was feared likely to allow sufficient 
time for a gap to emerge between operating costs and prices during which costs 
savings would not be passed on to consumers. While nominally it was prices which 
were being regulated, implicitly price regulation was a form of return on capital 
regulation. Similarly, the prices which emerged from US-style capital regulation had 
to be politically acceptable. In the United States, for much of the 1950s and 1960s 
investor-owned utilities had enjoyed an implicit understanding with regulators that 
allowed returns on reasonable capital investment would be fair, adequate and pretty 
predictable. Yet, even with the partial liberalisation of the electricity industry, the 
risks arising from competition both within the industry itself and from outside, from 
the oil and gas industries, were sufficiently high to deter large, long-term sunk 
investments such as in nuclear power stations. The concerns with the ability of 
competitive markets to draw forth such capital investment which had found 
expression in the Austrian economists’ preference for dynamic over static analysis 
acquired fresh pertinence. So too did the work of an industrial economist like G.B 
Richardson who, as Stigler urged the strengths of the theory of perfect competition in 
the later 1950s, reflected in 1960 in his book Information and Investment on the 
failure of economists, with the notable exception of Hayek, to pay sufficient attention 
to the type of information required for capital-investment decision-making in and by 
an industry.
29
 Richardson reminded his fellow economists of Menger’s pioneering 
work on the marketability of assets.
30
 Ideas which resurfaced in Keynes’s exposition 
of his concept of liquidity preference could also be applied to investment decisions. 
Just as individual liquidity preference might reflect individual anxieties about the 
future, then so too might industrialists prefer various forms of liquidity reflecting the 
differing marketability of assets to a decision to engage in sunk capital investment. 
Again, this pointed to a market that was always on the move, and that it ever found 
equilibrium was debatable. Certainly the founders of modern equilibrium analysis 
were aware of its transitory delicacy and Walras preferred to approach it, as though 
playing ‘What’s the time Mr Wolf?’ through a process of tâtonnements.31 
      In the initial Pool trading arrangements designed by the Austrian-economics-
influenced Stephen Littlechild for the newly privatised electricity supply industry, 
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specific payments were made to companies for making existing capacity available and 
the high system marginal price resulting from the day-ahead auctions did make future 
investment in nuclear power potentially attractive. However, this high system 
marginal price arose in part from the ability of two dominant players, National Power 
and Powergen, to ‘game’ the day-ahead bidding system. In 1998 System Marginal 
Price in the Pool was still set more than two-thirds of the time by the two largest 
generators, and almost all the time by only four generators. Pool prices were still 
some 10-20 % above the new entry level based on the latest gas-fired plant.
 32 
In time, 
in response to complaints from large customers and competitors of the electricity 
supply industry, the financial bids in the Pool gave way to the physical bilateral 
contracting of the NETA. Competition was increased in the industry, not least as 
National Power and PowerGen agreed to divest a total of 6GW of existing coal-fired 
plant, which was purchased by Eastern Electricity and subsequently run at higher 
output than it had previously been. Nine years on from privatisation, the duopoly was 
only half its size at vesting. In 1998/99 National Power and PowerGen accounted for 
below 40% of generated output, and this market share was to fall further. Increased 
competition in and outside the industry, regulatory periods significantly shorter than 
the lifetime of large sunk investment and the ending of Pool prices offering a 
considerable margin above the lowest marginal costs of nuclear generators, made it 
more attractive to earn returns reasonably quickly on new CCGT technology than to 
place undue trust in the future and sink money into nuclear.
33
 The inability and/or 
unwillingness of government to provide assurances to would-be investors in nuclear 
power of the level and security of their future returns on their capital investment was 
consistent with a wish to develop a more competitive electricity market; it did 
however leave unanswered the questions as to how, if government decided that new 
large long-term sunk investment was required, it was to be made.  
      In contrast to the privatisation of the electricity supply industry, that of the water 
industry retained a series of local monopolies within the industry and provided a 
system of price regulation which specifically recognised the increasing costs and 
future capital investment requirements of the industry. Rather than the usual RPI-X 
form which restricted prices to X per cent below the RPI for a specified number of 
years, the water companies were offered RPI+K where K was an allowable price 
increase above inflation to be used to finance the investment plans necessary to 
upgrade capacity and meet quality standards.
34
 At privatisation, the parlous condition 
of the water industry and the need for new investment to stop leaks and to meet new 
environmental standards had been apparent. Under the pre-privatisation structure of 
the water industry established by the 1973 Water Act,
 
ten RWAs (Regional Water 
Authorities) had been established and charged with planning and controlling the use 
of water in each river catchment area. Each RWA was responsible for more than one 
river basin, and collectively it was hoped to achieve an integrated river-basin 
management. RWAs were responsible for a range of water uses within their broad 
remit of supplying of water, disposing of sewage and managing sewerage, and 
overlaid on these were responsibilities for water resource planning, pollution, 
fisheries, flood protection and land drainage, water recreation and environmental 
conservation. By the time of privatisation it was clear that investment by the RWAs 
had been inadequate, and there was particular concern with the decline in river water 
quality. At privatisation the activities of production and regulation were separated. 
The newly-created water supply PLCs lost their environmental activities which were 
transferred to an external body, the National Rivers Authority. The Drinking Water 
Inspectorate took over responsibility for household water quality and for the 
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implementation of EC directives, and the economic regulation of the industry was 
delegated to the newly-created Office of Water Services (OFWAT).
35
 While the 
functions of supply, regulating and environmentally protecting water supply and 
sources were separated out, the fundamental economic characteristics of the industry 
restricted the competitive threats faced by each water company. While the regulator 
and the regulatory formula encouraged the industry to undertake investment and to 
price at long-run marginal cost, market structure made this more likely to happen in 
the water than in the electricity supply industry.  
   
 
Responsibility 
 
      Inasmuch as problems concerning fuel and water poverty and the securing of 
heavy sunk investment were at worst caused and at least exacerbated by the 
privatisation of utilities and the liberalisation of their markets, the question arose as to 
whether addressing such problems ultimately remained, despite privatisation, a 
responsibility of the state. For Hayek and other neo-liberals, poverty was an outcome 
of a market process and not necessarily reflective of individual fault. In a market what 
made an individual unique was “not his generic but his concrete knowledge, his 
knowledge of particular circumstances and conditions’ since ‘it is of the essence of a 
free society that a man’s value and remuneration depends not on his capacity in the 
abstract but on success in turning it into concrete service which is useful to others 
who can reciprocate.” 36 While a market was a system for providing and co-ordinating 
information, there was no presumption that a market produced a ‘just price’. As 
markets produced poverty as an outcome of its process of working, then so too should 
poverty be addressed, for while poverty and ‘deprivation are evils....they are not 
injustices’.37  
      Dealing with poverty as an outcome was fundamentally different from making the 
alleviation and eradication of poverty an aim of policy. Indeed, for neo-liberals the 
state should not pursue such aims; the state should be nomocratic rather than 
teleological. Although not himself a neo-liberal, Michael Oakeshott’s distinction 
between a teleocracy (an order devoted to the pursuit of some overall end, goal, or 
purpose) and a nomocracy (a rule governed order not devoted to the attainment of 
particular ends)
 
had been developed by Hayek in the second volume of ‘Law, 
Legislation and Liberty: The Mirage of Social Justice’. 38 In a nomocracy political 
institutions provide a framework of general rules which facilitate the pursuit of private 
ends, however divergent such ends may be. It was neither the function of political 
institutions to realize some common goal, good or purpose nor to galvanize society  
around the achievement of such a purpose. This distinction between nomocracy and 
teleocracy had some overlap between the distinction later urged by Friedman between 
positive and normative economics as well as with the praxeological, rather than 
jurisdictional or political science, approach of von Mises.
39
 Like Buchanan, von Mises 
saw the ends of human action as being subjective and he rejected the idea of all 
human action being directed at some kind of overall goal, happiness or welfare or 
whatever. Rather human action was undertaken to remedy some subjectively 
perceived unease in life.
40
 
      So, while the nomocratic state could address poverty which was an outcome of 
market operations, it should certainly not seek to adjust the relative outcomes by 
pursuing egalitarian policies. The ‘mirage of social justice’ in which a normative 
preferred distribution was pursued was unappealing to neo-liberals, both in itself and 
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in being teleocractic. To neo-liberals, justice was not about the patterns of distributive 
outcomes but about the process of the market.
41
 The neo-liberal was concerned with 
the absolute position of the worst off, not with their relative position. However, to 
return to earth, it was not entirely clear how given the neo-liberal acceptance of the 
need to address poverty, how the practical problems of fuel and water poverty were to 
be alleviated.  
      That the lowest income groups spent a higher proportion of their household 
budget on energy than did higher income households was clear from Engel curve data 
and from FES snapshot evidence.
 42
 In 1984 the poorest households spent over 13% of 
household expenditure on energy while for households with incomes in excess of 
£17,500 the proportion of total expenditure on energy was around 7%. Yet, in contrast 
to expenditure on food which fell as a share of household expenditure as income rose, 
energy expenditure remained fairly constant as a share of household budgets as 
income increased. Energy could then be viewed both as an absolute and as a 
participation merit good. Low-income groups were also likely to convert fuel less 
efficiently into power and heat than were higher-income households. In the mid-
1980s, while those with household incomes of less than £3500 per annum were less 
than three times as likely to have gas central heating as electric, those with incomes in 
excess of £17,500 p.a. were fourteen times as likely to have gas as electric heating. 
Income issues aside, in the mid-1980s the 30% of households living in council 
accommodation and the further 8% living in privately-rented accommodation also had 
little, if any, choice over the type of heating in their households.
 43
 Being less likely to 
have gas central heating, the poorest also missed out on the slower increase in gas 
than in electricity charges.
44
 
    The nationalised industries’ early practice of pricing at average cost offered cross-
subsidised prices to all income groups. As an approach to making essential output 
available to the poor this was effective, but as a means of welfare provision it was 
inefficient. As James Meade had argued in 1946, poverty was an income problem and 
should be dealt with as such. By the 1980s with the trend towards pricing at long-run 
marginal cost continuing, there was little appetite among policy makers for 
approaches towards tackling fuel poverty which involved a return to the past practices 
of interfering with the level or structure of prices. As an income problem, fuel poverty 
was properly dealt with through social security. However, as the system of social 
security developed from the 1980s it seemed reluctant to deal with fuel poverty head-
on as an income problem. Rather it seemed to target particular groups, such as 
pensioners, for help or to identify particular circumstances, such as cold weather, in 
which additional payments would be made. That pensioners spent proportionately 
more on fuel than non-pensioner households was clear.
45
 While energy expenditure 
formed on average between 5-7% of the budget of non-retired households, it formed 
17% of the budget of single retired households mainly dependent on the state pension, 
and 12% for retired couples mainly dependent on the state pension. Cold weather in 
the winter of 1985-6 led to the introduction of the ‘trigger temperature’ system for 
single payments in exceptionally severe weather. Neither of these payments was 
income-related. While in particular circumstances weekly additions to supplementary 
benefit could be made to cover energy costs, with the replacement of supplementary 
benefit by income support replaced as part of the social security reforms of 1988, no 
provision was made for the continuance of such payments. The contrast was with the 
payment of means-tested housing benefit, which was received by slightly more than 7 
million households in the UK more than one-third of the population. Regional 
variation in rent had long occasioned additional payments to social security recipients, 
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but nonetheless in the mid-1980s 13% of the expenditure of the poorest group was 
spent on energy, more than the 10% spent on housing.
46
   
 
Conclusion 
 
      Moves towards pricing utility output at long-run marginal cost began before and 
continued after privatisation. The concern with pricing was an expression of deeper if 
episodic political concerns with public expenditure and of an underlying rising drone 
of interest among economists that the resource costs of capital investment be better 
reflected in the level and structure of output prices. When prices were adjusted, both 
their level and their structure impacted on the poorest groups in society whose 
composition was changing. Rather than groups like pensioners sitting at the bottom of 
the income ladder, this place was increasingly occupied by unskilled people where 
no-one in the household worked. The social security reforms effected from the late 
1980s sought to increase the incentives to work, and as such seemed reluctant to make 
equivalent provision for the unemployed as for the old on matters such as assistance 
with fuel costs. While government did not abandon its responsibility to address the 
problem of poverty, other policies such as privatisation and social security reform 
reduced its ability to do so. While Mrs. Thatcher alluded to the work of Hayek, her 
governments’ policies were often at times less compassionate and forward-looking 
than the work of the Austrian and neo-liberal economists. For Menger, von Mises and 
Hayek, risk and uncertainty were dominant concerns. The inability of markets to fully 
include the factor of time and to overcome uncertainty was clearly recognised by the 
Austrian school of economists; hence the urging of a dynamic rather than a static view 
of markets. The liberalisation of markets in which large sunk investments were 
required simply increased uncertainty and risk, and made those investments less likely 
to occur. Increased competition could make the existing assets work harder, but the 
increased uncertainty about future returns and relative prices pushed time-related 
discount rates higher thereby reducing investment in new large sunk assets. This 
might not matter, except that in industries like energy, governments express concern 
about the security implications, be they environmental, economic or military, of a 
failure to solicit sufficient long-term sunk investment. While issues of national 
security are a legitimate area for government activity, most of those concerns, be they 
with global warming or electricity capacity shortages, currently work backwards to 
the present from a future projection of danger. Government appears to have shifted its 
area of responsibilities forward in time, while working with present markets which 
accommodate time inadequately. It might be better for government to accept 
responsibility for the present precisely by acting to reduce current uncertainty about 
the future.    
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